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WEIGHING FIDUCIARY DUTIES WITH 21ST CENTURY 
REALITIES—EVALUATING THE VIABILITY OF REMOTE 
PARTICIPATION FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
The laws governing a board of directors are grounded in the principle that 
directors owe certain fiduciary duties to the companies they serve.1 Those 
same laws, determined by states, are often outdated and fail to take into 
account the ways in which modern technology can help boards operate more 
efficiently. One way that modern technology could have a large impact on a 
board is by enabling remote participation in formal board activities.2 This use 
of remote participation, similar to that which is currently used for remote 
stockholder meetings, should be accepted as standard in the corporate law of 
all states. 
In a majority of states, remote participation is already allowed for 
stockholder or shareholder meetings.3 For instance, Delaware, a recognized 
leader in corporate law, with over half of all Fortune 500 companies 
incorporated within the state,4 codified standards for remote participation in 
stockholder meetings.5 Stockholders who are not able to be present in person 
now have the opportunity to participate through the utilization of video or 
telephone conferencing.6 Of states that allow for remote participation, some 
require that the company’s board of directors first approve the use of the 
remote participation for stockholder meetings.7 
 
 1 See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A 
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 349 (2012). 
 2 For purposes of this article, a formal board activity is any action done by a board of directors requiring 
a quorum. 
 3 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Securities Regulation and the Global Economic Crisis: What Does the Future 
Hold?: Article: Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1367, 1368 (2010). As 
of 2010, thirty-two states addressed the issue of remote stockholder participation. 
 4 See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002) 
(citing Marcel & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
1205, 1211, 1225, 1251 (2001)). 
 5 8 Del. C. § 211 (2014). Some corporations in Delaware already use this existing provision to apply to 
remote board of directors meetings. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. Delaware requires the board of directors to first approve of remote communication for 
stockholder meetings. 
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Directors have specific duties owed to the corporation that do not apply to 
mere stockholders, including the duties of care and loyalty.8 Directors who 
cannot participate in board meetings risk breaching these duties and, as a 
result, face substantial legal consequences.9 There is an understandable fear 
that directors who participate remotely would not be as actively invested in a 
board meeting, and thus might risk violating the duties they owe to a 
corporation. These concerns are misplaced, however, as a director who chooses 
to participate remotely would be held to the same standard as a director who 
attends the meeting in person. Thus, the remotely participating director would 
be required to be actively involved. Furthermore, new technology would 
actually serve to protect stockholder interests because director involvement 
could increase through remote participation. It would allow directors, many of 
whom may not live near the location of director meetings, to participate and 
contribute to board activities. Rather than face the possibility of missing 
meetings entirely, directors could choose to participate remotely. 
Additionally, corporations—and as a result, their stockholders—could save 
money by not having to pay the expenses for each board member to attend 
each board activity or meeting. This method of participation allows directors to 
more fully maintain their duty of care, which requires them to exercise good 
business judgment.10 Reducing costs is a sound way to uphold this obligation 
while simultaneously increasing director engagement. 
One way to balance the risks associated with having directors use remote 
participation is to require stockholders to approve the board’s policies and use 
of remote participation. This would create a system of checks and balances 
between directors and stockholders, as many states already require boards of 
directors to approve stockholder remote participation.11 
While state laws may not expressly forbid remote participation for boards 
of directors, it is in the best interest of states to include language that clearly 
allows for remote participation. States that fail to enact explicit remote 
participation statutes create an unnecessary burden for the companies 
incorporated within its borders, and therefore run the risk of losing business to 
states with more progressive corporate protections. 
 
 8 Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 
1233 (2010). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still A Haven For Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 
982 (1995) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 11 See 8 Del. C. § 211 (2014). 
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